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Investment in securities is more prevalent now than ever.'
People are investing with goals such as sending their children to
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1. [Tlhe number of investors has been growing almost as fast as the value of
the markets themselves over the last fifteen years. In 1983, 19% of American
households owned stocks; today over 48% of households are in the market
through direct ownership of shares, mutual funds or employer-provided
retirement programs such as 401(k) plans, according to an exhaustive study
released late last month by two securities trade associations. It's not just the
rich who have taken the plunge: half of all equity owners earn less than $
60,000 a year. In all, nearly seventy-nine million people now own stock.
See Ronald Brownstein, Washington Outlook; National Perspective; Though
Workers Are Now Investors, They Don't Think Like Capitalists; If anything, the
buoyant economy (symbolized by the soaring markets) has taken the edge off the
public's anti-government sentiments of the early 1990s, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999,
at A5; see also S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995) ("In just the past ten years, capital
raised [by securities investment] has risen by 1,000%."); Steven A. Ramirez,
Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the
Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1056 (noting
that stock ownership by Americans in 1965 was at 10.4% and grew to 43% by
1997) (citing Peter D. Hart Research Associates, "A National Survey Among
Stock Investors," Conducted for the NASDAQ Stock Market (1997)) available
at,
http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/SeclVolComp.asp (last visited Nov. 17,
2001) (showing the yearly share volume increase from 1975-2000).
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college,2 early retirement,3 and supplementing Social Security.
4
Many of the investors today are not as sophisticated or
experienced in investment as investors were thirty years ago.'
Despite this growth in the securities industry, protections for these
new investors are decreasing.6 Recent laws passed by Congress
have made it more difficult for investors to pursue securities
claims.7 Courts have also become stricter about allowing securities
class actions to move forward Moreover, an investor does not
have the breadth of recourse through arbitration as he does
through litigation.9
This Note intends to demonstrate the diminishing options of
investors in the courts and the inequity that exists in the resolution
of securities disputes. Part I discusses the background and history
of securities actions, class actions, and arbitration. In Part II, this
Note addresses how the courts have changed their views regarding
2. See Kathy Barks Hoffman, Saving Up for College, BISMARK TRIB., May 8,
2001 at 1C ("[A]bout $ 2.5 billion was invested [in college savings programs] by
the end of 2000, an amount [C.P.A. Joseph Hurley] expects to reach $10 billion
by the end of the year. He expects the same fourfold increase in the number of
accounts, which he says could reach 1.6 billion by the end of 2001.").
3. See Humberto Cruz, The Key to Your Financial Success; Why All This
Obsession with Being a Millionaire, SEATTLE-POST INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 19,
2001 at D1 (quoting a study by the Million Dollar Round Table as saying "it will
be a huge challenge for people to realize their hopes of an early retirement
without a financial plan, especially considering the length of time their nest egg
will have to last as a result of increases in the average life span").
4. Accord Brownstein, supra note 1.
5. See Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the
Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 27, 37 (1998) ("With the increase in the number of active investors on the
Internet comes a corresponding increase in potentially unsophisticated
investors."); cf. Michael R. Davis, Note, Unregulated Investment in Certain Death:
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 42 VILL. L. REv. 925, 927 (1997) ("The influx of
individual unsophisticated investors into this unregulated market [of viatical
settlements] and the large number of start-up firms offering individual investors
access to this market has dramatically increased the potential for investors to be
defrauded or abused by inexperienced or sham investment companies.").
6. See infra Parts I.B and II.A-II.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Parts II.A-II.B.
9. See infra Part III.
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securities actions, class actions, and arbitration. Part III discusses
the details of arbitrating both individual and class action securities
claims. Part IV argues that similar securities disputes can have
varying outcomes, based on venue and the lack of uniformity
undermines investor confidence in the courts and the prospect of
justice.
I. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF SECURITIES ACTIONS, CLASS
ACTIONS AND ARBITRATION
The sale of securities occurred concurrently with the Industrial
Revolution.'" As companies grew in size, they sought ways to
finance new ventures." The sale of stocks provided a means for
them to raise capital.'2 However, the sale of these securities was
essentially unregulated. 3 The price of securities was often inflated,
due to fraud."' The result of these inflated prices culminated in the
1929 stock market crash,15 which marked the beginning of the
10. See Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Note, Private Securities
Litigation: The Need for Reform, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 295-296
(1998) (noting that the modem securities market was based on the foundation
provided by industrialization).
11. Id. at 296.
12. See Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who
May Challenge Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 81, 98 (1999) ("During the Industrial Revolution, the ownership of stock
corporations became much more widely held, and judicial recognition of the
derivative suit was needed to deal with the increasing conflicts between
shareholders and managers.").
13. See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integrity,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
14. See Lisa Feiner, The Second Circuit Review - 1982-1983 Term:
Commentary: Broker-Dealer's Duty to the Marketplace, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 783,
794 (1984); see also David Ross, Should the Law Prohibit 'Manipulation' in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 503, 504 (1991) (noting that fraud
continued after the 1929 stock market crash).
15. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity
Futures Industry - History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 59, 101 (1991)
(explaining that the feverish desire to get rich from stocks led to the crash of the
stock market in 1929).
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Great Depression.6 Individual citizens lost personal fortunes, as
did banks that had invested heavily in the market. People feared
that the banks would be unable to cover their deposits, causing a
rush to withdraw holdings, and ultimately resulting in the failure of
many banks."
President Roosevelt sought to minimize the effects of the
depression by implementing the New Deal, a program of
government regulations and public projects. 8 The New Deal
sought to ease the financial burdens of the citizenry by creating
jobs, establishing the Tennessee Valley Authority, 9 aiding the
farming sector, standardizing labor and wages, and regulating the
railroad industry.' It also included the passage of numerous
securities regulations.
A. Securities Legislation as a Result of the New Deal
The first of the New Deal securities legislation enacted was the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),2 intended to protect
investors22 by preventing the inflated prices' that caused Black
Thursday.2' Congress also sought "to promote investor confidence
16. See James R. Repetti, Corporation Governance and Stockholder
Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
971, 973 (1992).
17. See SEC, "The Investor's Advocate," supra note 13.
1& See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1066; see also Duane R. Chartier,
Roosevelt's 'New Deal' - Brief Notes, New Deal Preservation Association,
available at
http://www.newdeallegacy.org/history-newdeal.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
19. The Tenneesee Valley Authority is a public power company that also
provides economic development and "supports a thriving river system." See
http://www.tva.gov/abouttva/keyfacts.htm#whatis (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
20. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Outlining the New Deal Program, Address to the
American People (May 7, 1933), available at
http://newdeal.feri.org/chat/chat02.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
22. See Catina & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 297.
23. Other causes attributed to the stock market crash in 1929 include insider
trading, unjustified issuances, buying on the margin, great amounts of unsecured
consumer debt, investment of all assets in the stock market, speculative
investment by banks.
24. See Stock Markets, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999; see also Beth H. Friedman,
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in the United States securities markets and thereby to encourage
the investment necessary for capital formation, economic growth,
and job creation."'  The Securities Act requires that all offerings
either be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC")' or be exempt from such registration.' In addition, the
legislation sought to provide investors with information about the
securities for sale and to prevent fraud, misrepresentation, and
deception.?
The Securities Act, however, did not require any degree of
disclosure from parties selling securities among themselves after
the shares were initially introduced to the market.29 Therefore,
only a year later, Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 ("Exchange Act"),' ° requiring disclosure by dealers and
brokers of such securities,3  and subjecting them to SEC
regulation.32 The Exchange Act regulates reporting activities, such
as accounting practices,33 the buying back of shares by issuers,34 and
filing of reports.35 The activities of directors and executives with
more than ten percent ownership of a company are also scrutinized
The Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Determinations in Subsequent Federal Securities
Litigation, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 655, 668 (1987) (noting that the Securities Act
was intended to protect investors).
25. S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995).
26. Registration has numerous requirements, including a description of an
issuers business and assets, description of the issuance, information about
company management, and financial statements by independent accountants.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).
27. Exempted offerings include private offerings, offerings of limited size,
intrastate offerings, and securities offered by local and federal governments. See
15 U.S.C. § 77c (2000).
28. See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that
Govern the Securities Industry, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
29. See Fred Knopf, Using Federal Magistrates to Resolve Securities Disputes:
A Viable Alternative, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 537, 538 (1992) (noting that the
Exchange Act was intended to fill in gaps from the Securities Act).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
31. See id. § 781.
32. See id. § 78o.
33. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
34. See id. § 78m(e).
35. See id. § 78m(b).
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as a result of the Exchange Act.36 Both the Securities Act and
Exchange Act were intended to restore confidence in U.S. financial
markets.37
In order to provide and enforce securities regulations, the
Exchange Act created the SEC." Significantly, only the Exchange
Act preempted state securities actions. 9 Neither the Securities Act
nor the Exchange Act explicitly allowed for private actions.'
However, as will be shown in the following section, the courts
nonetheless allowed such actions.4'
The next in the sequence of securities legislation passed under
the New Deal was the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of
1935 ("PUHCA"). 4  By implementing federal regulation the
PUHCA eliminated unfair practices and abuses by electric and gas
utilities. 43 The legislation prohibited such companies from using
their profits to subsidize unregulated business activities." Federal
Regulation was necessary because states were unable to regulate
the interstate activities of local electric and gas companies.45
Several years later, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939
T.I.A. ) was enacted. The T.I.A. requires corporate issuers to
appoint trustees for the benefit of their bondholders.47 Issuers must
36. See id. § 78p.
37. See Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions be Required in All
Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities
Industry, 45 AM. U.L. REv. 152, 153 (1995).
3& See C. Steven Bradford, The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action
For Proxy Fraud: The Parallel Between Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REv. 306,
313 (1991) (demonstrating the breadth of regulatory powers granted to the SEC).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(h) (2000).
40. See Catina & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 301.
41. See discussion infra Parts II.A-II.B; see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at
1067.
42- See 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000).
43. See Amy Abel, Electricity Restructuring Background: Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), RS20015 (1999), available at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/eng-47.html (not paginated) (last visited Nov. 17, 2001);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 79a (2000).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 79i (2000).
45. See Abel, supra note 43.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa - 77bbbb (2000).
47. See id. § 77bbb.
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also provide financial reports ' and confirm that all conditions of
the indenture have been met '9 to these appointed trustees. The
trustee is also empowered to disclose information regarding the
securities holders if three or more holders indicate a desire to
communicate about their rights under the indenture.'
In 1940, Congress passed the Investment Company Act
("Investment Act"). 1 The Investment Act extended the SEC's
regulatory power to include mutual funds. The Investment Act
also distinguishes between different types of investment
companies. 3 Additionally, it requires that control of investment
companies remain in the hands of independent directors.'
That same year, the Investment Advisors Act ("Advisors
Act")'S was passed. The Advisors Act requires all investment
advisors to register with the SEC." Investment advisors are
defined as those who counsel customers to buy, sell, or hold
securities.' As with the other legislation discussed above,
Congress passed the Advisors Act with the intention of protecting
unsophisticated customers from fraud and misrepresentation. 8
4& See id. § 77nnn.
49. See id. § 77nnn(a)(3).
50. See id. § 77111(b).
51. Id. §9 80a-1 - 80a-64.
52 See id. § 80a-2(c).
53. See id. §§ 80a-4 - 80a-5 (noting that investment companies can be
qualified as "face-amount certificate," "unit-investment trust," or "management
company" and further divided into open or close-ended and diversified or non-
diversified).
54. See id. § 80a-10(a).
55. Id. §§ 80b-1 - 80b-21.
56. See id. § 80b-3 ("it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, unless
registered under this section, to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his or its business as an
investment advisor").
57. See id. § 80b-2(11) (2000).
5& See Carol E. Garver, Note, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Note: Lowe v. SEC- The First
Amendment Status of Investment Advise Newsletters, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 1253,
1253 (1986) ("Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940... to
protect unsophisticated investors from unscrupulous investment advisors and to
disassociate legitimate investment advisors from the professional stigma created
by the fraudulent activities of their less-ethical colleagues"); see also 15 U.S.C. §
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B. Securities Legislation in the Last Decade
While Congress was attempting to protect the unsophisticated
investor, none of these statutes protected companies from
investors. Investors were easily able to file "strike suits""s and
fraud claims against companies.' Congress became concerned
about the growing number of frivolous securities cases.'
The House and Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive
practices committed in private securities litigation include: (1)
the routine of filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and
others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock
price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer,
and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead
eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of
deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters,
and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without
regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery
process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often
economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the
manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent. These serious injuries to innocent
parties are compounded by the reluctance of many judges to
impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
except in those cases involving truly outrageous conduct. At
the same time, the investing public and the entire U.S. economy
have been injured by the unwillingness of the best qualified
persons to serve on boards of directors and of issuers to discuss
publicly their future prospects, because of fear of baseless and
extortionate securities lawsuits."
In response to this growth, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") s in 1995, ' thereby
80b-7 (2000).
59. A "strike suit" is "a derivative action brought against a corporation either
for nuisance value or to obtain a favorable settlement." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 605 (pocket ed. 1996).
60. See Catina & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 301 n.28.
61. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731.
62. Id.
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z (2000); id. §§ 78u-4 - 78u-5.
64. See 141 CONG. REC. H140039-02 (statement of Rep. Bliley, indicating
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amending both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.65 The
PSLRA sought to curtail the abuses in securities actions in four
ways:' 1) increasing the standards for pleading fraud by requiring
specific facts that create a strong inference that the defendant
acted purposefully,67 2) implementing rules limiting who can serve
as lead plaintiff' and how lead counsel is chosen,69 3) staying
discovery while a motion to dismiss is considered,' and 4)
prohibiting most71 lawsuits based on forward-looking statements.2
that the PSLRA was intended to counter frivolous securities claims); see also
Catina & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 297.
65. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369.
66. See C. Evan Stewart, While Rome Burns - Fiddling With Reforming
Reform in the Securities Industry, PERSPECTIVES ON LEGISLATION, REGULATION,
AND LITIGATION, Vol. 2, No. 11, Nov. 1998, no pagination, available at
http://www.winston.com/catalog.nsf/DomainQuery?OpenForm&Seq=l (last
visited Nov. 17, 2001) (discussing other changes introduced by the passage of the
PSLRA).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, courts were
split over what standard was needed to plead securities fraud. Some courts
required a strong inference of intent, pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act. Other courts required pleadings of fraud to be particular, pursuant to Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Catina & Schmitt, supra note
10, at 306-07. The Rule 9(b) pleading, used in the Second Circuit, was codified
by the PSLRA. See Marc I. Steinberg, Symposium, Securities Arbitration: A
Decade After McMahon: Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the
Courts, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1503, 1519-20 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg I,
McMahon] (explaining that the PSLRA's pleading standard was the same as the
standard used in the Second Circuit, as demonstrated in Wexner v. First
Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1990)).
6& See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(2)(A); id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A).
69. See id. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(v); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
70. See id. § 77z-1(b); id. § 78u-4(b).
71. The PSLRA included two exceptions to the prohibition against suits
based on forward-looking statements. Such suits were valid if (1) the future
statements were made without a reasonable basis, id. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(B) - 77z-
2(b)(1)(D); id. §§ 78u-5(b)(1)(B) - 78u-5(b)(1)(D); or (2) when corporate
disclosure is made in bad faith, id. § 77z-2(b)(1)(A)(III); id. § 78u-
5(b)(1)(A)(III). These exceptions are applicable even if the statements in
question were made with fraudulent intent. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1076.
72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c); id. § 78u-5(c). Forward-looking statements are
those that project events that are believed to occur in the future, such as company
earnings, projected dividends, or anticipated product launches.
202 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
The PSLRA also requires courts to scrutinize all claims under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure73 and to act upon
violations that it discovered. ' These requirements sought to 1)
eliminate a low pleadings standard, 5 2) encourage institutional
investors to serve as lead plaintiffs76 and to prevent lawyer driven
securities litigation,' 3) prevent plaintiffs from filing suit and then
using discovery to find grounds for the action,78 and 4) encourage
companies to disclose information without fear of litigation.79
73. Rule 11 provides courts with discretion to impose sanctions against claims
that are not supported by the law, that are not supported by any evidence, or
those pursued for improper reasons. See FED. R. Civ. PRo. Rule 11.
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c); id. § 78u-4(c).
75. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369 ("The House and Senate hearings on
securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish uniform
and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless
lawsuits."); see also Stewart, supra note 66.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 34, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
733; see also H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369 ("The Conference Committee believes
that increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately
benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of representation
in securities class actions."). This requirement also sought to eliminate
"professional plaintiffs," who owned nominal shares of numerous companies in
order to serve as lead plaintiff in the case of a securities class action. See H.R.
REP. No. 104-369 at 32-33.
77. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369; see also Stewart, supra note 66
(recognizing that "boutique law firms who exploited to the hilt their ability to use
the 'big stick' of discovery expense to obtain lucrative settlements" as a reason
leading to the passage of the PSLRA).
78. As [Richard J. Egan] noted, 'once the suit is filed, the plaintiff's law firm
proceeds to search through all of the company's documents and take endless
depositions for the slightest positive comment which they can claim induced the
plaintiff to invest and any shred of evidence that the company knew a downturn
was coming.'
See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369 (quoting Testimony of Richard J. Egan, Chairman
of the board of EMC Corporation before the Securities Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, June 17, 1993)); see
also Stewart, supra note 66 (noting that the stay in discovery intended to save
companies the expense of discovery if a court determined the claim was without
merit).
79. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369 ("Fear that inaccurate projections will
trigger the filing of securities class action lawsuit [sic] has muzzled corporate
management."); see also Stewart, supra note 66.
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The PSLRA has made it more difficult for potential plaintiffs
to proceed in court with a securities claim, especially in class
actions.' The new pleading standard is difficult to meet81 and has
not provided uniformity in the pleadings. Courts have varied on
how to fulfill the new pleading standard.82 The new rules regarding
lead plaintiff have not succeeded in encouraging more institutional
investors to serve as lead plaintiffs.83 Nor have the rules regarding
lead counsel created more competition in the area of securities
80. See generally, John C. Coffee, Jr., Commentary on Seligman, 33 HOUSTON
L. REv. 376, 380-81 (1996) ("Another reason... [an] investor may find
arbitration more attractive than litigation involves a recent development known
as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act .... [because] the Reform Act is
adverse to the interests of small investors."); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at
1058, 1072-80 (1999) (discussing additional barriers to securities actions imposed
by the PSLRA, such as heightened causation requirements, limitations on joint
and several liability, and greater disclosure requirements in the settlement of
class actions).
81. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet A Description of the
Arduous, and Now Often Fatal Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law
Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1996-97); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1074-
75. Some have held that the new scienter requirement cannot be met without an
explicit confession of intent. The new scienter requirement could also prevent
plaintiffs from bring suit against parties that were jointly responsible for drafting
the allegedly false or misleading materials. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1075-76.
Additionally, the new scienter requirement is made more difficult meet because
plaintiffs do not have discovery to help them find evidence of intent. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1076.
82. See Stewart, supra note 66 (noting that after PSLRA, some courts require
pleadings to demonstrate "recklessness" or "motive and opportunity", while
others will accept only "recklessness" or "motive and opportunity", and still
others have accepted "deliberate recklessness") (citations omitted). See, e.g., In
re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997). But see Zeid v.
Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
83. See Stewart, supra note 66 ("[Flew large institutional investors.., have
been eager to take the lead or co-lead in suits filed since the PSLRA became
effective".). In fact, it has been suggested that the new lead plaintiff rules will
only promote additional litigation to determine who will serve as the lead
plaintiff. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and
Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus.
LAW. 335, 374 (1996); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1087.
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litigation. '  It has not been shown that companies have been
providing investors with more information.85 As a result, private
enforcement of securities violations has been severely
compromised. 6  The required Rule 11 assessment has also
diminished private securities claims, as sanctions tend to be
frequent in securities litigation. '  Essentially, passage of the
PSLRA has been detrimental to investors8 and has further
burdened securities plaintiffs.89
Despite its detrimental effect on investors, the passage of the
PSLRA resulted in increased filing of securities actions in state
courts.' Many companies were sued in both federal and state
84. See Stewart, supra note 66 (noting that Milberg, Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, the pre-eminent plaintiffs law firm in securities actions, has been
involved in over 60% of securities cases nationwide, as opposed to 31% prior to
the passage of the PSLRA); see also K. Donovan, Class Action War Heats Up,
NAT'L L. J. Al (Dec. 22, 1997); D. Osborne, Getting Back at Lerach, AM. LAW.
49 (Sept. 1997).
85. See Stewart, supra note 66 (noting the lack of empirical evidence showing
that this intention was met and suggesting that because securities claims in state
courts would continue with greater disclosure, because of the lack of specific
examples of correct disclosures, and because of a lack of law interpreting the
scope of the PSLRA exception, companies would not be inclined to offer more
forward-looking statements).
86. See 141 Cong. Rec. S19040 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (letter from Professor
Arthur R. Miller of Harvard University Law School); see also Ramirez, supra
note 1, at 1060, 1087-89 ("The PSLRA has the obvious side-effect of throwing
out the meritorious with the frivolous.., they simply seem to be an arbitrary
means of terminating or chilling claims.., far from facilitating a merits-based
adjudication, the PSLRA seems certain to further delay any merits reckoning.").
87. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1074; see also Hope Viner Samborn, Fear of
Filing, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 28.
88. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1507 (noting that
"[e]nactment of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ... also
spells 'gloom' for uninitiated investors"); see also Marc I. Steinberg, Litigation
Reform Act Will Have Major Impact, 24 SEc. REG. L.J. 115 (1996) [hereinafter
Steinberg II, Litigation Reform Act].
89. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1529; Interview by Deborah
Marchini with Mike Oxley, Congressman, Ohio, CNN (Mar. 8, 1995) [hereinafter
Oxley Interview] (asking "[w]hy is it necessary to tilt the balance further in favor
of the securities industry" by passing the PSLRA).
90. See M. Perini, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273 (1998); see also Sambom, supra
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courts in order to circumvent the stay of discovery.9 In response to
this increase' and at the urging of high-tech and accounting
companies,' Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act ("Uniform Standards Act")." The Uniform
Standards Act provides that claims of securities fraud brought in
state court are to be pleaded at the level outlined in the PSLRA.95
C. Congress and Arbitration
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA" ).96 Congress intended to overcome judicial distrust of
note 87 (reporting a study done by Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino
that supported that while litigation rates did not change very much after the
PSLRA, twenty-six percent of the activity moved to state courts); Securities and
Exchange Commission Office of the General Counsel, Report to the President
and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (1997), reprinted in Practicing Law Institute,
Sailing in 'Safe Harbors': Drafting Forward Looking Disclosures, 61, 72 (1997)
[hereinafter SEC Report to the President] (claiming that the number of securities
class actions filed in state courts had increased in an attempt to circumvent the
provisions of the PSLRA, including the stay of discovery. But see 0. Starkman,
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits Make Comeback in Federal Court, WALL ST. J.,
at B1l, July 9, 1997.
91. See Stewart, supra note 66 (noting that the PSLRA allowed investors to
choose the forum in which they brought suit, even if they had little or no contact
with the state).
92. For a discussion of the pros and cons of reform after the PSLRA, see
generally Catina & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 312-17. Congress considered both
the Uniform Standards Act and the Securities Litigation Improvement Act,
which proposed amending both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act by
creating uniform pleading standards. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The
Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v.
MCA Inc., 73 N.Y.U.L. REv. 765, 786 n.88 (1998) ("[S]everal bills have been
introduced to ensure the effectiveness of the [PSLRA] by halting migration of
class actions to state courts and avoiding inconsistent standards in state court
litigation .... [including the] Securities Litigation Improvement Act... and
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ....").
93. See Robert A. Prentice et al., Corporate Web Site Disclosure and Rule
10b-5: An Empirical Evaluation, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 531, 549-50 (1999).
94. Pub. L. No. 105-353 (1998).
95. See Bruce J. Heiman, The Do-something Congress, J. COM., Oct. 30, 1998.
96. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
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arbitration agreements ' and recognized that a party in arbitration
does not lose his statutory rights, but simply exchanges one forum
for another." The FAA essentially provides that agreements to
arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."" In theory, the
existence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements prevents courts
from hearing disputes it otherwise had jurisdiction over.'" The
FAA also limits the grounds on which courts can vacate arbitration
decisions. Arbitration decisions can only be set aside if the
proceedings were based on fraud,' corruption," or if the
arbitrator did not act properly. 3 Moreover, courts can only alter
or correct arbitration decisions if there is a mistake," if the matter
was not submitted to the arbitrator,0  or if the award was improper
in its form."
D. Congress and Class Actions
Class actions historically have proved critical to the
protection of rights of employees, consumers, medical patients,
racial or ethnic minorities, and others who lack the resources to
litigate individual claims."'" Congress recognized the benefits of
97. See Schrek v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1974) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68h Cong., 1" Sess., 1, 2 (1924)).
98. 137 CONG. REC. S14,154 (1991) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.")
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
99. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
100. Id. § 2.
101. Id. §§ 10(a)(1).
102. Id. § 10(a)(2).
103. Id. §§ 10(a)(3) - 10(a)(4); see also Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Find
Print: 'You Can't Sue Us' Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers From Taking
Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at A01 ("Arbitration... usually
doesn't allow for appeals.").
104. 9 U.S.C. § 11(a).
105. Id. §11(b).
106. Id. § 11(c).
107. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 1, 12 (2000).
Class actions also promote judicial efficiency, consistent outcomes, fairness,
justice for those with small claims that do not justify individual litigation, and
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class actions with the passage of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938." With the passage of Rule 23, Congress
aimed to increase the use of the class action in the courts.
19
Congress was aware that class actions could prevent inconsistent
verdicts among individual class members.' Congress also
considered the fact that class actions promote judicial efficiency."'
Moreover, class actions provide a means by which small monetary
harms against a large number of people can be heard, as the
monetary value of such individual harms is often less than the cost
of adjudicating the claim."'
Rule 23 was amended in 1966, with the addition of numerous
procedural protections and rules regarding case management by
the courts."3  Congress sought to eliminate inconsistent or
incompatible decisions in cases with similar factual circumstances
and to encourage the use of the class action in civil rights cases and
other disputes that were not individually worth litigating.
'4
Current members of Congress continue to note the individual and
societal benefits of class actions, including racial desegregation of
schools, compensation for those who suffer injury due to toxic and
other dangerous products, and justice for victims of employment
discrimination.1
15
save taxpayers money. See Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration and
10b-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 380, 393 (1989).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see also Joel Seligman & Lindsey Hunter, Rule
23 Class Actions: At the Crossroads: Introduction, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 407, 407
(1997).
109. Id.
110. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
111. See 147 CONG. REC. E 1234 (2001) (statement of Bob Goodlatte); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
112. See 147 CONG. REc. E 1234.
113. Seligman & Hunter, supra note 108, at 408-09.
114. Id.
115. 145 CONG. REc. S1145 (1999). But see 147 CONG. REC. E. 1234
(statement of Bob Goodlatte, introducing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2001,
aimed at limiting the flood of class actions in state courts and forum shopping).
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II. SECURITIES DISPUTES, ARBITRATION, AND CLASS ACTIONS IN
THE COURTS
The courts were once supportive of the rights of investors and
interpreted securities legislation broadly and to the advantage of
plaintiffs."6 However, with the increase in securities investment
and in securities disputes, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have become less sympathetic towards plaintiffs."7
A. Securities Actions and Arbitration
After the passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
courts generally interpreted these statutes broadly."' Despite the
existence of the FAA,"9 the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan"
held that claims brought under the Securities Act could not be
arbitrated' because the Securities Act provided that "any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any securities to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void."" The Court interpreted this portion of the Securities
Act to prohibit investors from waiving their right to choose the
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See infra Part II.B.
11& See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1067-68.
119. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
120. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
121. Id. at 188-89. For a discussion of the historical reluctance of courts to
enforce arbitration agreement, going back to English law, see Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternate Dispute
Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 577, 599-608 (1997).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000). In fact, "[aill six SEC statutes [the Securities Act,
the Exchange Act, PUHCA, TIA, the Investment Act, and the Advisors Act]
specify that any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of the Act or any rule of the
Commission 'shall be void."' Joel Seligman, The Quiet Resolution: Securities
Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HOUSTON L. REv. 327, 330 (1996)
(quoting the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2000); Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (2000); Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(h) et seq. (2000); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa et. seq. (2000); Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-1 et seq. (2000); Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (2000)).
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forum in which to resolve disputes."z  The Court was also
concerned that arbitrators who were not bound by the law, could
not properly protect the rights of plaintiffs, who could not
investigate securities as thoroughly as sellers." Additionally, the
Court was also worried about the limited judicial review of
arbitration decisions"z and the fact that arbitrators did not have to
explain their decisions." Therefore, the Court held that judicial
redress was guaranteed by federal securities laws and that the right
to bring a claim in court could not be waived, pursuant to section
12(2)"v of the Securities Act."
Almost twenty years later, however, the Court took a step
towards recognizing the validity of arbitration agreements, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.29  In Scherk, the respondent
purchased three foreign entities believing that the trademarks of
the companies were unencumbered.' When Alberto-Culver
learned that the trademarks were encumbered, they sought
restitution under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.'3' The Court
held that the arbitration clause included in the sale contracts were
enforceable because of concerns that parties would be hesitant to
enter into international contracts.
32
Lower courts extended the Supreme Court's rationale to the
Exchange Act and refused to compel enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. "3 However, a new problem arose when a
plaintiff's claim included both a federal securities claim that was
123. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
124. Id. at 435-36.
125. Id. at 436.
126. Id.
127. Now section 15 U.S.C. § 12(a)(2).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2000).
129. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
130. Id. at 508.
131. Id. at 508-09.
132 Id. at 516.
133. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 364-67 (1988) [hereinafter Katsoris I, McMahon]. See,
e.g., Berg v. Administrator of Fund for Participating Pledgers of F. I. DuPont,
Glore, Fagan & Co., 378 N.Y.S. 2d 875 (2000); Kiehne v. Purdy, 309 N.W.2d 60
(1981); Sandefer v. District Court, City of Denver, 44 Colo. App. 343 (1980);
Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 422 Pa. 66 (1966).
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subject to litigation and a non-federal securities claim that was
subject to arbitration." Various courts sought the conflict in
different ways: some courts required the bifurcation of the claims 35
and others required the litigation of the claims.36 The Supreme
Court finally resolved this conflict in 1985, with Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.'37 The Court held that a federal securities
claim could be litigated while a related non-federal claim
proceeded to arbitration."' This created the danger that two claims
based on similar facts could be resolved differently.39
Only two years later, in Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon,"° the Supreme Court found that securities actions
brought pursuant to the Exchange Act could be arbitrated.' The
Court based its decision on the growing prevalence of commercial
arbitration and of arbitration by many of the stock exchanges,
under the SEC regulation.142 The Court found that "there is no
reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the
law.""'43 The Court also relied on the FAA"M and section 29(a) of
the Exchange Act, which voids any waiver of rights granted under
that statute.4 5 As a result of McMahon, the party contesting
arbitration has the burden of demonstrating that Congress
intended to preserve the right to judicial recourse, despite the
existence of any outstanding arbitration agreement.'
Securities Act claims became subject to arbitration shortly
thereafter, with the decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
134. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Resolution of Securities Disputes, 6
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307 (2001) [hereinafter Katsoris II, Resolution].
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
13& Id. at 223.
139. See Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at n.19; see also Katsoris I,
McMahon, supra note 133, at 9-11.
140. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
141. Id. at 238.
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. at 232.
144. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
145. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-38.
146. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
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Shearson/American Express, Inc.147 Wilko was overturned."M
B. The Attitude of the Supreme Court Toward Securities Litigation
Although the courts initially favored securities actions after
the passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,"" they
became less tolerant as the number of such actions grew." As a
result, their approach to securities actions became narrower.'51
Even before McMahon and Rodriguez, beginning in the mid 1970s,
the Supreme Court limited the ability of investors to bring
securities claims.
5 2
147. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
14& Id. at 485. Ironically, when Wilko was overturned, investors were
unhappy, fearing that the trade organized arbitrations would favor the
brokerages. See Robert Gregory, Arbitration: It's Mandatory But It Ain't Fair, 19
SEC. REG. L.J. 181 (1991). An article in the New York Times stated, "the
brokerage houses basically like the current system because they own the stacked
deck." William Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1987, at 1, 8. However, since then, many authors have recognized the fairness of
securities arbitration. See Shelly R. James, Note, Arbitration in the Securities
Field: Does the Present System of Arbitration Between Small Investors and
Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J. CORP. L. 363, 376-84, 389 (1996);
see also Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1531-32; William A. Gregory &-
William J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration: A Need for Continued Reform, 17
NOVA L. REv. 1223, 1241 (1993); Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1102-04.
149. Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1510, 1517-18 (noting that
"secondary liability doctrines seeking to hold brokerage firms and supervisory
personnel liable encompassed aiding and abetting, controlling person, and
respondeat superior" and recognizing the "expansionist decisions" rendered in
the 1960s and early 1970s) (citations omitted).
150. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1068-69; see also Steinberg I, McMahon,
supra note 67, at 1518 (recognizing that "[b]eginning with the mid 1970s and
continuing to the present, investors generally have fared progressively worse
under federal law).
151. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1069.
152. See Branson, supra note 81, at 6 ("In forty federal securities law
decisions, the [Burger and Rehnquist] Court[s] decided thirty-two cases for
defendants and, in almost every one, significantly narrowed the reach of federal
securities laws."). But see Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1069 (recognizing only the
Supreme Court's limitation on private securities actions in the 1990s).
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In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,"' the Supreme Court required
a showing of scienter'" in private securities actions. The Court
found that in passing the Exchange Act, Congress was specific
about which scienter elements, such as knowledge, intention,
negligence, and innocent mistake, applied to various statutory
violations.'55 Despite disagreement by the SEC,'56 the Court held
that "when a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation
and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances - the
commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing -
and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct."57
In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,5' the Court held that scienter
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act required a showing of
deception or manipulation.'59 The Court also specified that
manipulation is a "term of art" in securities actions,"W indicating
actions such as wash sales, 6' matched orders,62 or rigged prices.' If
the plaintiff could not meet the federal pleading standard, the
Court held that "it is entirely appropriate.., to relegate
respondent and others in his situation to whatever remedy is
153. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
154. "(1) The fact of an act's having been done knowingly, esp[ecially] as a
ground for damages or criminal punishment. (2) Prior knowledge or intention.
(3) Loosely, guilty knowledge; intent to defraud." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
563 (pocket ed. 1996).
155. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 207-08.
156. See id. at 197-98.
157. Id. at 214.
158. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
159. See id. at 473.
160. See id. at 476.
161. "The simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, selling and buying of the
same asset, esp[ecially] stock, by the same person to create the impression of
market activity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 560-61 (pocket ed. 1996).
162. "The illegal practice of simultaneously entering identical or nearly
identical buy and sell orders for a security to create the appearance of active
trading." See http://www.investorwords.com/m2.htm#matchingorders (last visited
Nov. 17, 2001).
163. "The practice of artificially inflating stock prices, by a series of bids, so
that the demand for those stocks appears to be high and investors will therefore
be enticed into buying the stocks." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 551 (pocket ed.
1996).
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created by state law.' "
In Chiarella v. United States,6 ' the Supreme Court found that
silence does not create liability unless there is a duty of disclosure.
In Chiarella, a printer of takeover bid announcements was able to
deduce the names of companies to be acquired and bought shares
in the companies before the announcements were public, later
selling the shares at a profit after the announcements were made
public.'66 The Court found that the printer was not guilty of fraud
because "one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is
under a duty to do so."" Either a fiduciary duty or a relationship
of trust or confidence creates a responsibility to disclose." The
printer did not receive the names of the companies to be taken
over from the acquirers and therefore did not have a duty of
confidentiality.'69
In Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petrigrow v. Gilbertson,7 '
the Supreme Court shortened the statute of limitations for private
10(b) claims. 1 It found that while in some cases, federal courts
should "borrow" the statute of limitations imposed by the relevant
state, state law was not generally applicable for securities fraud
claims because of the need for national consistency and the fact
that other sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
established statute of limitations for other violations.7 Therefore,
a maximum three-year statute of limitations was established.' The
Court also held that time calculated to determine the statute of
limitations is not subject to equitable tolling because the three year
maximum served to limit actions and tolling would undermine that
164. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
165. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)
166. See id. at 224.
167. Id. at 228.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 231.
170. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petrigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991).
171. Id. at 361-62.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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goal."
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., the Court held that aiding and abetting claims
under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act was no longer permissible.'
"[T]he private plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a
defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)' " and "the
text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a
§ 10(b) violation."'78 Thus, securities statutes that do not expressly
allow aiding and abetting liability no longer allow claims to be
made under that theory.'79 In the dissent, Justice Stevens noted
that liability under the theories of conspiracy and respondeat
superior would soon follow."8
In Gustafson v. Alloyd, 8' the Court limited rescission claims
under the Securities Act by limiting such actions to purchasers of
the securities."' The Court also limited the types of
communications that plaintiffs could use to demonstrate reliance,
finding that face-to-face conversations and telephone
174. Id. at 363; see also Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1523-24;
Gordon W. Stewart, Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1021 (1982).
175. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
176. Id. at 177. For a discussion criticizing the decision in Central Bank of
Denver and demonstrating how lower courts have circumvented that decision, see
Stewart, supra note 174 (noting how a case in the Third Circuit found that a law
firm could be held liable under Section 10(b) if it drafted a document relied upon
by an investor, that a case in the Sixth Circuit held that statements made to
investors by an attorney created a duty to provide non-misleading and complete
information, and that a case in the Ninth Circuit found that an accounting firm
could be liable for fraud for drafting a disclosure document).
177. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173.
178. Id. at 177.
179. Id. at 177-78.
180. Id. at 200. Lower courts have subsequently prohibited conspiracy claims
in private securities actions. See, e.g., Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No.
82 C 4762, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3352 (N.D. I11. 1995); In re Faleck & Margolies,
Ltd., Civ. Nos. 89-8548, 90-1356, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re
Medimmune Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1995).
181. Gustafson v. Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
182. Id.
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communications could not be used to show fraud." They stated,
"it is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive
liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller
in the secondary market."" Moreover, the decision limited fraud
claims under section 12(2) to issuers. '85 Finally, the Court
prohibited fraud claims against brokerages or agents, holding that
a prospectus was essentially equivalent to information in a
registration statement related to the public by the issuer or
controlling shareholders. '
Other courts followed suit.1" The new federal restrictions have
183. Id. at 575-76.
184. Id. at 578.
185. Id. at 572.
186. Id. at 569.
187. See Avery, supra note 83, at 341-47 (noting that after Central Bank of
Denver and Gustafson, lower courts also disposed of cases early because of a
perception of abuses in securities litigation). See, e.g., Wells v. Monarch Capital
Corp., No. 97-1221, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 30031, *20-21 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding
that mistakes by accountants relying on statements by the state insurance
department examiners, viewing surplus as a regulatory and not an accounting
issue, and relying on an "internal collectibility analysis" did not constitute
knowing, deliberate, or reckless fraud and therefore did not meet the scienter
requirement for fraud); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1433 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("[Clompanies [do not] have.., a general obligation to
disclose all material information."); United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618
(8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the misappropriation theory could not be used to
find liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act because the theory is based on
the breach of fiduciary duty, not "material misrepresentation or nondisclosure");
In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413-15 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
that language indicating risk or the need for caution in forward-looking
statements can eliminate a claim for securities fraud); Melder v Morris, 27 F.3d
1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that allegations, without more, against an
accounting firm for failure to use particular accounting standards do not support
fraud claims); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)
(determining that allegations that executives made fraudulent statements in order
to maintain the benefits of their positions were insufficient to show scienter);
Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (because
"predictions of future growth... will almost always prove to be wrong in
hindsight," projections of future performance are insufficient to support
allegations of fraud); Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1078 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[A]
manipulative or deceptive omission is an omission which renders the other
affirmative statements made by an individual misleading .... [W]here the non-
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been extended to state claims brought with federal securities
claims."M Many state claims are being dismissed along with the
federal claims. 9 Moreover, the tone of federal securities opinions
has become hostile."' It has been believed that securities claims
were the cause of the litigation overtaking the federal courts.9'
disclosing party explicitly informs the other party of his failure to disclose, an
omission will not be misleading in the absence of special circumstances such as
the inability of the dependent party to understand or appreciate the significance
of the undisclosed information."); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 41
(6th Cir. 1991) (finding that defendant brokerage firm did not meet the scienter
requirement of deception and did not have a duty to explain the compensation
system for certain transactions where the broker told the apparently
sophisticated plaintiff that commissions were not charged); DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d
1550, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Where a contract [for the sale of securities] is
unenforceable, an action for damages cannot be maintained on the ground of
fraud in refusing to perform the contract, even though the promisor at the time of
making the oral contract may have had no intention of performing it."); Pross v.
Baird, Patrick & Co., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing a
section 10(b) claim for unauthorized trading on the grounds that the action was
for breach of fiduciary, not fraud, because of the absence of scienter).
188. Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1528.
189. See, e.g., Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir.
1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated
on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914; Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 479 (2d Cir. 1988).
But see Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1992); Gochnauer v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1048-51 1 (11th Cir. 1987).
190. See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1554-55 (9th Cir.
1994) ("These various discrete deficiencies are not the only problems with the
complaint .... [it] is unwieldy in the extreme .... 113 pages long.., rambles
through long stretches of material quoted from defendants' public
statements .... [demonstrating] poor draftsmanship."); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,
901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) ("People sometimes act irrationally, but
indulging ready inferences of irrationality would too easily allow the inference
that ordinary business reverses are fraud. One who believes that another has
behaved irrationally has to make a strong case. ").
191. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12599 (1992); see also Oxley Interview, supra note 89
(stating that the PSLRA was necessary because:
[Tihe explosion in class action lawsuits has become somewhat of a cottage
industry in certain areas, and as a result, we've had enormous difficulties,
particularly with entrepreneurs, startup companies that are highly
capitalized and need to provide new technologies and new ideas, and in
many cases those are exactly the kinds of business that are attacked in these
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However, such distaste has been limited only to private claims;
cases brought forth by public agencies continue to receive support
from the courts."n Overall, courts have recently been less tolerant
of securities claims and have been dismissing them more often.9
C. The Supreme Court and Class Actions
The Supreme Court adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1937." However, even prior to its adoption, the
Supreme Court allowed class action suits, where the number of
parties was great."5 Since the adoption of Rule 23, the Court has
refined its decision, disallowing the aggregation of claims "where
there are numerous plaintiffs having no joint or common interest
or title in the subject matter of the suit."'96 Furthermore, plaintiffs
cannot aggregate the amount of their losses to meet the damage
class action suits.).
192. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1071-72; see also Steinberg I, McMahon,
supra note 67, at 1527-28. This policy has harmed investors even more.
"Investors are most sensitive to their pocketbooks and only private enforcement
truly protects this interest." Id. at 1083. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424 (1981) (finding that under Section 17a of the Securities Act, a pledge of
stock as collateral constitutes an offer of sale of a security); United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (holding that for the government to bring an action
under 15 U.SC. § 77q, the fraud could impact either investors or brokers, not just
investors as was previously required).
193. Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decision on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 489
(1995).
194. Jennifer Denham Henderson, Protecting Rule 23 Class Members From
Unfair Class Action Settlement: The Supreme Court's Amchem and Ortiz
Decisions, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 489, 493 (2000).
195. See, e.g., Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921) ("[A]
court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire
body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.");
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1850) ("[Wlhere the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body
may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others; and a bill may also
be maintained against a portion of a numerous body of defendants, representing
a common interest."); Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566, 585 (1829) ("[Slome of the
members of a voluntary society or company, when the parties are very numerous,
may use for an account against others, without joining all.").
196. Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 588 (1939).
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requirement needed for a diversity action.'" The Court has also
found that non-certification of a class is not subject to appeal until
a final decision is rendered, as the denial of certification does not
affect the merits of the case.'98
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has rendered at least one
decision favoring plaintiffs where certification is denied. The
statute of limitations is tolled where motions for intervention are
timely filed.'99 "The commencement of a class action suspends the
applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the
class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to
continue as a class action."2'
The Supreme Court has also rendered other decisions in favor
of class action plaintiffs. In Hansberry v. Lee, the Court found that
"[t]here has been a failure of due process only in those cases where
it cannot be said that the procedure adopted fairly insures the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be found by
it. The interests of the absent plaintiffs are sufficiently protected
by the forum state when those plaintiffs are provided with a
request for exclusion that can be returned within a reasonable time
to the court."20 ' In other words, specifically as long as plaintiffs
have a chance to opt-out of the class, their due process rights are
protected.' Moreover, parties have a right to a jury trial in a
derivative class action if the corporation whose name the action is
brought under would be entitled to the same. 3
The Supreme Court has also found that plaintiffs alone do not
necessarily bear the cost of the notice requirement of class
197. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973) (holding that
all plaintiffs, not just those named in the complaint, must meet the amount in
controversy requirement); Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969) (disallowing
the aggregation of claims after the 1966 amendment of Rule 23).
198. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v. Rope, 445 U.S.
326, 441 (1980); see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978)
("The fact that an interlocutory order may induce a party to abandon his claim
before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for considering it a 'final decision'
within the meaning of § 1291.").
199. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
200. Id. at 553.
201. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
202. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814 (1985).
203. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 531, 542 (1970).
2001] INEQUITIES INSECURITIES DISPUTES
actions.' The Court has allowed class members to appeal a
decision where the named plaintiffs fail to do so' and allow for the
resolution of disputes under the exclusive purview of the federal
courts outside of the federal jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court has recognized the benefits of class action
suits. "The class-action devices save the resources of both the
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting
every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion
under Rule 23. " ' The Court has also recognized that class actions
allow the cost of litigation to be spread among plaintiffs.'
Additionally, class actions protect absent plaintiffs.'M  The
advantages of aggregating claims have also been noted by the
Court.21°
III. ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES CLAIMS
Arbitration is "a method of dispute resolution involving one or
more neutral third parties who are chosen by or agreed to by the
204. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989) ("It makes sense... to
place on [the parties to a lawsuit] the burden of bringing in additional parties...
rather than place [the burden] on potential additional parties... to intervene
when they acquire knowledge of the lawsuit" because the parties to the suit
better understand the scope and nature of the litigation.); see also Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356 (1978) (holding that "the district court
properly may exercise its discretion under Rule 23(4) to order the defendant to
perform" a required task with less difficult and expense). But see Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1979) (finding that plaintiffs must bear the
cost of notice to class members).
205. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977) ("Post
judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal... [is] timely... in litigation...
and in which the intervention might... be thought to have a less direct interest in
participation in the appellate phase.").
206. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385 (1996).
207. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982), quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979); see also Leslie W. O'Leary, Mass Tort
Class Action: Will Amchem Spawn Creative Solutions?, DEF. COUNS. J. (1998).
208. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03
(1980).
209. Id.
210. See Guarantee Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also
O'Leary, supra note 207.
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disputing parties, and whose decision is binding. '21' It has many
advantages. Arbitration reduces costs, 2 which are lower than
those associated with litigation.213  It is also more efficient ,21
typically resolving disputes within months instead of years. 5
Furthermore, arbitration allows claims to be resolved by experts,216
as opposed to the lay people of a jury"1 7 or judges with little
211 iexperience in the field at issue. Unlike litigation, arbitration is
not conducted at the expense of taxpayers219 supporting the judicial
system. Instead, the parties themselves pay for the arbitrator, 2M
filing fees,"I and any other costs.' Arbitration also allows the
211. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 40 (pocket ed. 1996).
212 See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 458 (1987); see
also Mayer, supra note 103.
213. See Fletcher, supra note 212, at 458; see also Roger S. Haydock, Civil
Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation and
Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 759 (2000)
("Arbitration filing fees and hearing fees, and elective attorney fees, are much
less than the total of litigation costs and expenses and mandatory attorney
fees.").
214. See Fletcher, supra note 212, at 458.
215. See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration - A Success Story: What
Does the Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 188-89 (1996); see also
Mayer, supra note 103.
216. See Anthony DeToro, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration of
Investor-Broker Disputes, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 615, 619 (1991) ("[P]arties often
benefit from the arbitrators' specialized knowledge .... ").
217. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086-87
(3d Cir. 1980) (noting that due process may be denied when juries hear complex
cases).
218. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1119 (noting that "specialized arbitrators
also may be preferable to judges; [a]n arbitrator who is an accountant is likely to
know what motivates accountants better than a judge without an accounting
background").
219. See Fletcher, supra note 212, at 458; see also Coffee, supra note 80, at 379
("[T]he taxpayer does not bear the cost of these [arbitrated, securities]
disputes.").
220. See Janet M. Grossnickle, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How
the Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the
Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. REv. 769, 770 (1995).
221. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 483, 558 (1996) [hereinafter Katsoris III, SICA].
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parties to choose the procedural rules that will apply,' 3 limiting the
rules can save both time and money, especially in the area of
discovery.' Finally, arbitration has the advantage of being fair,
something the courts cannot always provide when statutory law
does not support the most just outcome.'
Many of these advantages, such as lower costs, time efficiency,
resolution by experts instead of lay people, and funding by the
parties involved, exist in securities arbitration. Arbitration of
securities disputes can result in awards based on standards other
than the law, such as industry customs or equity.n6
Securities arbitration also has the advantage of pleading
requirements that are simpler than those required under federal
litigation.' It does not require a written decision, thereby helping
to provide efficient resolution of the dispute, encouraging people
to serve as arbitrators, and limiting the appeal of arbitration
awards.'
Nonetheless, arbitration also has disadvantages. One great
concern is that it allows legal obligations and rights to be
circumvented. 9 Parties can simply contract to use or not use
statutes from specific locales."0 Furthermore, parties can agree to
22Z See Nelson D. Blank & Lansing C. Scriven, Survey of Florida Law:
Alternate Dispute Resolution: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REv. 33,
43-44 (1994) (noting that travel and other expenses of witnesses and arbitrators
and the costs of producing evidence are born by the arbitrating parties).
223. See Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and
Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1285 (2000).
224. See Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes:
Encouraging the Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 262-63 (1995) ("The limited discovery [under
arbitration] ... saves a significant amount of time, as well as money."); see also
Grossnickle, supra note 220, at 770 ("[Ajrbitration is often characterized by
limited discovery.").
225. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1112.
226. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1514-15.
227. Id. at 1512-13.
228. Id. at 1516-17.
229. See Guzman, supra note 223, at 1298 ("[R]ules that offer [parties to
arbitration agreements] substantial benefits will be avoided if the joint costs of
the rule outweigh its benefits."); see also Mayer, supra note 103 ("The ability to
gather evidence is much more limited than in court proceedings.").
230. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial
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limit where disputes will be resolved,31 thereby affecting the
procedural rights of the parties.2" Some arbitration agreements
have gone as far as to limit the manner in which parties address
problems, by contracting to resolve problems outside of the judicial
system. 3  These concerns are especially relevant in cases of
unequal bargaining power.'
The use of arbitration has had different results throughout the
country; it is more favorable to plaintiffs in some states than in
others.235 Requiring arbitration of securities disputes is favorable to
some but deprives others of generous state laws. New York is a
pro-industry state where arbitration offers plaintiffs more options
than state litigation. 36 However, courts in other states favor
plaintiffs, 7 allowing recovery for negligence in primary and
secondary trading markets.3 Some do not require plaintiffs to
show reliance or that the defendant's actions caused the loss. 239
Collateral participant liability,2' longer statutes of limitations,
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFFALO L. REv. 49, 77 (1997).
231. See Keith Highet & George Kahale III, Decision: Arbitration - Punitive
Damages - Choice of Law - Federal Arbitration Act. Mastrobuono v. Shearman
Lehman Hutton, Inc. 115 S.Ct. 1212: U.S. Supreme Court, March 6, 1995, 89
A.J.I.L. 601, 601 (1995) ("[S]ecurities firms use a nationwide standard-form
brokerage contract with a choice-of-law provision .... which [is] intended to
avoid punitive damages regardless of the circumstances.").
232 See Guzman, supra note 223, at 1289.
233. See Mayer, supra note 103 ("Arbitration... permits less evidence-
gathering that can help win a case. ").
234. See Davis, supra note 230, at 78.
235. See Steinberg II, Litigation Reform Act, supra note 88, at 1507.
236. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1529.
237. See id. at 1530.
23& See id. at 1530; see, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910,
920 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991); Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (Wash. 1980); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bryne, 320 So. 2d 436, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Fakhrdai v. Mason, 696 P.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
239. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1530; see also Marilyn Cane,
Proximate Causation in Securities Fraud Actions for Rescission, FLA. BAR Q.
REP., Spring 1989 at 14. E.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Rouseff, 537 So. 2d 978, 981
(Fla. 1989).
240. See generally, Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under
State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1027 (1992). See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 44-2003 (1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.43 (1992); Or. Rev. Stat. §
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and use of the theory of respondeat superior also exist in some
states. 42 Attorney fees and punitive damages are also available to
plaintiffs in some states.2 3 Pleading standards are lower in state
courts than in federal court.2 " State courts are also less likely to
dismiss securities actions."
Congress codified arbitration as a means to settle disputes with
the passage of the FAA.2' However, the courts did not sanction
arbitration as a means to resolve securities disputes until over
twenty-five years later, with the decisions in McMahon and
Rodriguez.'7  Today there is a "federal policy favoring
arbitration... [and] any doubts should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."2
A. Self-Regulator Oranizations
Arbitration in the American securities industry first began in
1872, when the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") offered it as
a service to resolve disputes.2"9 The National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") began using arbitration in 1968.'
59.115(3) (1980); Tex Rev. Civ. Stat. art 581-33F (1994).
241. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(4)(e); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-41; PA.
Stat. Ann. tit. § 1-504(a); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-33H(2).
242. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1530.
243. See id. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-2001; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2315.21; Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-22(2); Wash. Rev. Code § 21.20.430(1).
244. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1530. Compare R.R.S. Neb.
§ 25-207 (2001) (allowing for a fraud claim to be brought within four years of
discovery) and N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16 (2001) (allowing six years after
discovery to bring a fraud claim) and Burnes Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-7 (2001)
(granting six years within discovery to bring a fraud suit) with Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petrigorw v. Gilberton, 501 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1991) (allowing a
maximum of three years to bring a fraud claim, without equitable tolling).
245. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67, at 1530.
246. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
247. See discussion supra Part II.A.
248. Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145, 148 (7th Cir.
1995) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
249. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1097.
250. Id.
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However, these self-regulating organizations ("SROs") " ' did not
have consistent rules for arbitration. 2  The Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") was established in April
1977, as a result of suggestions made to the SEC. 3 SICA was
formed to develop a uniform set of rules for the arbitration of
disputes between buyers and sellers in the securities industry. '
SICA consists of the SROs, the Securities Industry Association,
and four public members."
SICA developed a uniform method for the arbitration of
claims of $2,500 or less."6 In 1978, SICA developed the Uniform
Code of Arbitration ("Uniform Code"), establishing uniform
arbitration procedures for the securities industry." In 1978, the
SEC approved changes submitted by the American Stock
Exchange, the NYSE, and NASD that were virtually identical. "
These changes required increased disclosure of arbitration clauses
to customers, prohibited arbitration clauses from limiting the
ability of customers to file complaints or limiting recovery,
increased the content of awards, and created a classification for
arbitrators. T9
The Uniform Code is not binding on SROs, but must be
formally adopted by the organization after a formal rule filing with
the SEC.2" However, given that the SROs are members of SICA26
251. Other SROs include the American Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, numerous regional stock exchanges, and the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board. See National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., Securities Regulation in the United States, Third Edition (1996)
[hereinafter NASD, Securities Regulation].
252. See Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at 313.
253. See id. at 314 for a more detailed explanation about the events leading up
to the formation of SICA. Specifically, SICA is comprised of eight stock
exchanges, the NASD, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the
Securities Industry Association and four members of the public. See Seligman,
supra note 122, at 336.
254. See NASD, Securities Regulation, supra note 251, at 46.
255. Id.
256. See Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at 315.
257. Id.
25& See Seligman, supra note 122, at 337.
259. Id.
260. See Katsoris III, SICA, supra note 221, at 521-22 (" [O]nce SICA adopts a
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and that all stock brokers are members of the NASD,' which has
adopted the Uniform Code, it applies to most securities disputes.'
Since its initial promulgation, the Uniform Code has been revised
numerous times, in consideration of new issues and more complex
cases.
264
Today, the Uniform Code allows almost all customers to
compel their brokerages to arbitrate a dispute, pursuant to the
brokerage's membership with an SRO.65 It also provides that the
rules of evidence are not applicable to arbitrations, 2  does not
allow for motions,' discourages the use of depositions,26 and
permits only informal discovery.69 A dispute is heard by a panel of
three arbitrators,' who have experience with securities" and
arbitration training.'2 The panel hears the dispute and renders a
new rule, each SRO generally goes back to their respective organization for
Board approval; and, if successful, such rule is usually then submitted to the SEC
for approval in a Rule 19(b) filing.); accord Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note
134, at 316 n.42 and accompanying text ("Once SICA adopts a new rule, each
SRO must then generally go back to their respective organization in order to get
a rule change which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval.").
261. See text accompanying notes 254 and 255.
262 See Mark J. Astarita, Overview of the Arbitration Process, available at
http://www.seclaw.com/arbover.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
263. Accord Seligman, supra note 122, at 346 ("[T]he securities exchanges and
the NASD have required arbitration to be subject to the process of a specific
exchange or the NASD."). The exchanges and NASD have adopted the Uniform
Code. See sources cited nn. 254 & 258.
264. Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at 317.
265. UNIF. CODE OF ARB. (as amended), reprinted in Katsoris II, Resolution,
supra note 134, at 381-418.
266. Id. § 21.
267. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1101-02 ("The Code authorizes virtually no
motion practice.").
268 See id. ("The Code... discourages depositions."); see also Katsoris III,
SICA, supra note 221, at 512 ("The Uniform Code omits any reference to pre-
hearing depositions; however, the circumstances under which such depositions
may be ordered by the arbitrators are discussed in the SICA Arbitrator's
Manual.").
269. UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 31(a)(3), reprinted in Katsoris II, Resolution,
supra note 134 (indicating that discovery is "more limited" under the Code).
270. Id. § 8(b).
271. Id. § 31(a)(5).
272. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1102 ("The arbitrators are individuals with
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decision and an award within thirty days. 3 Appeals are limited."4
However, the Uniform Code prohibits the arbitration of class
action suits. 5 Because the vast majority of securities customers are
required to arbitrate disputes, as required by their brokerage
account agreements,6 most individual claims are resolved using
arbitration.'r As a result, claims by individuals are subject to the
Uniform Code whereas claims certified as class actions are
resolved in federal courts, pursuant to federal statutes, including
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
1. American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") is one of the
nation's leading dispute resolution organizations."8 The AAA
arbitrates matters in areas such as commercial finance,
construction, labor and employment, health care, insurance, and
securities. 9 Nonetheless, according to the 1996 Ruder Report,
"[securities] arbitration... may no longer occur before the
[AAA]" because many arbitration agreements do not list it as a
possible forum for dispute resolution.' However, on January 24,
substantial securities experience and are required to undertake significant
arbitration training.").
273. UNIF. CODE OF ARB. § 28(d), reprinted in Katsoris, SICA, supra note 134.
274. Id. § 31(a)(4) (stating that the "right to appeal or to seek modification of
rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited"); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at
1101.
275. Id. § 1(d)(1) ("A claim submitted as a class action shall not be eligible for
arbitration under this Code ... ").
276. See Linda D. Fienberg & Matthew S. Yeo, The NASD Securities
Arbitration Report: A View from the Inside, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1996 at 7, 8.
277. See Therese Maynard, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon:
McMahon: The Next Ten Years, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1533, 1557 n.46 (1996)
(" [M]ost investor claims - if not virtually all claims made by individual investors -
are by arbitration.").
278. See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and
Evidentiary Norms Embedded within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY
L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998).
279. See www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
280. See Seligman, supra note 122, at 343 (quoting Arbitration Policy Task
Force, National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Securities Arbitration Reform 3
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2000, the AAA announced the creation of a two-year pilot
program in conjunction with SICA."' The program proposes that
brokerage firms voluntarily participate in the creation of an
independent dispute resolution organization that is not affiliated
with the securities industry.' Yet, the joint program does not
apply to claims that cannot be filed for arbitration with an SRO.23
Essentially, if a dispute cannot be brought before a traditional
SRO forum, it cannot be resolved through the new AAA/SICA
joint program.
2. JAMS and Securities Arbitration
JAMS has been a dispute resolution provider for over twenty
years. ' JAMS provides arbitration services in numerous areas,
including employment, construction, real estate, environmental
issues, intellectual property, and insurance.' It is also
participating in a joint pilot program with SICA.' However, like
AAA, JAMS is barred from arbitrating securities disputes that
cannot be filed with an SRO.'
B. The SEC and Arbitration
The SEC's adoption of Rule 15c2-2 initially prohibited broker-
(1996)); see also id. at 363 ("[T]he investor's only choice is to select an industry
sponsored arbitration forum because the AAA is infrequently included in the
predispute arbitration agreement as an alternate forum.").
281. Press Release, American Arbitration Association Chosen by the
Securities Industry to Resolve Broker/Customer Disputes, Jan. 24, 2000, available
at www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
282. Id.
283. Guidelines for the SICA Securities Arbitration Pilot Program, available
at http://www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
284. JAMS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/jams.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
285. Id.
286. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Selected to Provide Alternative for
Resolution of Securities Disputes (Jan. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/display-press.asp?id=55 (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
287. See http://www.jamsadr.com/sica.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
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dealer use of predispute arbitration clauses that claim to bind the
participants in the resolution of SEC claims.' However, after the
McMahon decision, the SEC rescinded the rule, as it was not
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding.289 Since then, the
SEC has endorsed the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the
securities industry.2' It has recognized some of the
aforementioned benefits, such as cost and time efficiency.29
However, it has prohibited SROs from arbitrating class actions.2'
As a result, individual securities claims may be arbitrated whereas
class actions are barred from that path of dispute resolution.
C. Courts and Class Action Arbitration
While the courts have come to enforce pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, the issue of arbitration of class actions has not been
thoroughly addressed by the courts, 293 especially the Supreme
288. See Seligman, supra note 122, at 340.
289. Id.
290. See Alternative Dispute Resolution, Exchange Act Release No. 34,40306,
63 F.R. 42891(Aug. 11, 1998) available at http:lwww.sec.govlruleslpolicy/34-
40306.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001) (declaring that "the Commission is
committed to the use of ADR .... ").
291. See http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbproc.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
292. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Amendments to NASD Rule
3110(0 Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Agreements with Customers,
Exchange Act Release No. 34,42160, 64 F.R. 66681 (Nov. 29, 1999) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nd9874n.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001) (requiring
that all agreement will state "no person shall bring a putative or certified class
action to arbitration. . ."); accord Jayne Levin, Industry Group Proposes Change
in Arbitration; Would Require Class-action Suits to Go to Court, INV. DEALERS'
DIG., July 15, 1991 at 8 ("[Tjhe securities industry, the self-regulatory
organizations, and the SEC have all agreed that the courts are better equipped to
handle class-action suits than arbitration panels.").
293. Numerous authors have supported the idea of arbitrating securities class
actions. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 107, at 126 ("[H]ybrid arbitral class
action should be permitted, but only so long as courts maintain sufficient
involvement to protect the due process rights of absent class members.");
Ramirez, supra note 1, at 1134 (calling for an exploration of the arbitration of
securities disputes); Waltcher, supra note 107, at 403-04 (arguing that classwide
arbitration promotes efficiency).
2001] INEQUITIES INSECURITIES DISPUTES
Court.29' It is unclear whether an arbitration panel can fulfill all of
the traditional roles of the judiciary in a class action.29 The
greatest issues seem to lie in meeting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 23 requirements' of prerequisites,
certification,2 9' and notice.' Such concerns include who will chose
the arbitrator and at what point in the dispute; awkwardness
because of the need for the courts to play a role; determining the
limits of class membership; deciding what constitutes adequate
notice; and fear that arbitrators are unqualified to determine class
issues."
California courts have been liberal regarding the arbitration of
class actions, undertaking the class issues themselves and allowing
the arbitrator to determine the ultimate outcome of the action.
For example, in Keating v. Superior Court,3°' a California case, the
court made determinations regarding certification and notice to the
class and was responsible for safeguarding the rights of class
members outside of the dispute.3 °" In another case, the court held
that a securities class action should be arbitrated by the American
Arbitration Association,3"3 despite the fact that portions of the
contract were illegal.3" In Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., ° the court recognized that resolving disputes among class
294. See Sternlight, supra note 107, at 38, 66 (noting that only arbitrator has
taken it upon himself to resolve a class action securities dispute).
295. "[C]lass actions require great judicial discretion, while arbitrations
operate outside the judiciary." Waltcher, supra note 107, at 400-01.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (a class so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable; a common question of fact or law; claims of the class
representative that are typical of the class; and a class representative able to
protect the interests of the class) and 23(b) (inconsistent or dispositive
discussions affecting class members; actions by the opposing party which treat
members as a class; and superiority of a class action over other methods).
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) -(c)(4).
299. Id. 23(c)(2).
300. See Sternlight, supra note 107, at 50-52.
301. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
302. See id. at 1209.
303. See supra note 279.
304. See Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 179 Cal.App.3d 935 (1986).
305. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super.
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representatives was an additional responsibility for the courts.3"
While the subject of class action arbitration requires further
exploration by the courts, to date, there has been little indication
that courts are willing to bar such arbitration," absent a
contractual basis.3
IV. THE INEQUITIES IN THE RESOLUTION OF SECURITIES DISPUTES
The discussion above demonstrates that disputes in the
securities arena are essentially decided in two ways:' individual
actions are arbitrated whereas class actions are litigated. However,
the differences between the methods creates different outcomes
for actions that are based on similar facts. Due to the passage of
the PSLRA, plaintiffs that undergo litigation have a higher burden
of proof and must face unsympathetic courts. Plaintiffs that
undergo arbitration have the advantages of efficiency, contracting
for specific forums, legal applications, and procedures.
The greatest difference, however, is that arbitrators are not
bound by the law. If justice or equity requires, arbitrators may
overlook legislation whereas the courts are bound by statute. In
essence, this allows plaintiffs in arbitrations to easily overcome
legal requirements which their counterparts in litigation must
prove to be more probable than not.31° Furthermore, this allows
1991).
306. See id. at 866.
307. But see Levin, supra note 292 ("To date, no class-action suits have been
arbitrated.").
308. See Sternlight, supra note 107, at 65 ("most courts have been willing to
order cases styled as class actions to arbitration"), at 62-62 (noting that in
Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 98C2178, 1999 WL 35304, at *2, the
Court found that plaintiffs can contract away their right to class action dispute
resolution), at 69-71 (stating that some courts have held that arbitration
agreements that do not address the class action issue cannot be arbitrated).
309. Securities disputes can also be resolved by mediation. However, this
method is informal and any resolution reached is based on the consent of the
parties. See Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at 363. As such, a discussion
of this method is not applicable, as this Note focuses on formal methods of
dispute resolution that are involuntary.
310. Ironically, the PSLRA was enacted because "[t]he lack of congressional
involvement has left judges free to develop conflicting legal standards, thereby
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arbitrators to pick and choose the law, if necessary, thereby
eliminating consistency in the resolution of disputes. As a result,
similar cases can be decided differently, based on whether the case
is litigated or arbitrated. Moreover, litigation outcomes also differ
based on whether they are resolved at a state or a federal level.
Such a variety of outcomes has created a system that encourages
plaintiffs to forum shop.
However, this is not the real problem with the system. In
theory, if arbitration is more advantageous to plaintiffs than
litigation, common sense would suggest that all plaintiffs simply
opt for arbitration.311 Unfortunately, neither life nor the legal
system is that simple. Class actions also have great advantages,
such as spreading cost and risk, allowing for the aggregation of
claims that might not otherwise be worth pursuing, and providing
defendants with a cheaper and more efficient means of resolving
mass claims."'
These advantages do not carry into arbitration. Instead,
plaintiffs in a class action must pay for the arbitration themselves.
While arbitration is less expensive than litigation, the cost of filing
an action, paying an arbitrator, and undertaking even limited
discovery can add up to a significant amount for a single investor."'
"If the expected recovery is small, it will be impractical for the
plaintiff to bear the cost of litigation in a federal court or to expect
that the federal court will be a friendly forum after the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act.""31  When the damages sought
are less than the cost of filing, paying for the arbitrator, and
discovery, an individual plaintiff has little incentive to pursue the
creating substantial uncertainties and opportunities for abuses of investors,
issuers, professional firms and others." S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995).
311. Accord Mayer, supra note 103 (quoting Professor Mark Budnitz as asking
why mandatory arbitration provisions are not clearly and visibly explained to
consumers if such clauses are so beneficial).
312 See supra Part III.
313. Id. ("[Tihe cost of arbitration can sometimes be significantly higher than
court fees, making it financially impossible for some consumers to seek relief....
[A]rbitration costs are... high enough to deter complaints."). Filing arbitration
claims can cost anywhere from $49 up and paying arbitrators can get as high as
$1,600 per day. Id.
314. Coffee, supra note 80, at 381-82.
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cheaper arbitration. Such individual plaintiffs may find themselves
"priced out of arbitration."315 As a result, defendants are less likely
to be held accountable for their misdeeds and "illegal actions could
go undetected.0 16  Therefore, the door has been opened for
defendant brokers and dealers to benefit at the expense of their
customers. Even when a defendant is confronted with his actions,
the arbitration clauses prevalent throughout the securities industry
may prolong the resolution of claims against him, requiring
individual arbitration or individual settlements.
V. THE SOLUTION
Securities disputes, whether individual or class actions, should
be resolved in the same manner and forum. Because of the growth
of securities disputes,317 it may be time to create a completely
independent and fair forum for their resolution. The SEC would
be the obvious agency to facilitate the creation of such a forum.
Given the complexity of securities issues, it appears obvious
that disputes in the area should be resolved by those with an
understanding of nuances of the laws and characteristics of such
investments.3 8 This would allow all parties to feel that any decision
reached would be fair and equitable under the circumstances. At
the same time, potential plaintiffs should not have to sacrifice their
right to an efficient319 and statutorily just resolution.3' ° This forum
would essentially be similar to the numerous administrative
agencies within the federal purview, such as the Social Security
Administration32 or National Relations Labor Board." Likewise,
this forum could constitute an Article I court," such as the Tax"2
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See Katsoris II, Resolution, supra note 134, at 371-78.
318 See DeToro, supra note 216 and accompanying text.
319. See Fletcher, supra note 212, at 458; see also text accompanying note 214.
320. See notes 229-234 and accompanying text.
321. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2000) (allowing the Commission of the Social
Security Administration to make determinations on the entitlement of benefits).
322. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000) (allowing the Board to determine whether
unfair labor practices are occurring).
323. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
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or Bankruptcy Courts.3" Either way, the forum would not have the
appearance or bias of SRO arbitration.
Independence, however, is not the only characteristic a new
forum would require. It is imperative that the forum and its judges
be able to meet the procedural needs of class action suits.326 This
would include limiting class membership based on similar facts or
legal premise, as well providing an ability to address the
requirements of notice and certification. Without the ability to
meet class action needs, such a forum would not resolve the
problem of inequity.
The forum should also incorporate some of the other
advantages of arbitration, such as efficiency. 3' This could be
achieved by maintaining limited discovery3" in straightforward
cases. This forum could also require informal discovery. Of
course, the more complicated the case, the less curtailed the
discovery can be. Nonetheless, shorter allowances of time and
greater supervision by judges or arbitrators will facilitate the
discovery process.
Any new forum would have to address the shortcomings of the
arbitration and litigation processes. Filing fees should remain
consistent with other courts and the costs of the judges or the
brokerage firms. Fees should be waived for low-income
plaintiffs.29 The costs of arbitration have been prohibitively high
for individual parties whose losses are less than the cost of
arbitration."l
The forum would also have to remain faithful to statutory law,
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.).
324. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2000).
325. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
326. See supra notes 296-299 and accompanying text.
327. See Fletcher, supra note 212; see also supra note 214 and accompanying
text.
328. See Paradise, supra note 224.
329. While it seems difficult to imagine a circumstance in which a plaintiff with
enough income to invest in securities would be unable to pay filing fees, it is
possible. Other federal courts allow for filing fee waivers in the case of financial
hardship. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000); TAX CT. R. 20(b).
330. See Coffee, supra note 80, at 382-82; see also supra note 314 and
accompanying text.
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including the rules of evidence and civil procedure. This will result
in consistency in the resolution of disputes with similar factual and
legal bases. Most importantly all decisions should be appealed to
district court. The limited appeals of arbitration, combined with
the ability to reach a decision without explaining the rationale, has
created a system where parties have no alternative when justice
does not prevail.33" '
Certainly, creating and implementing such a forum cannot be
done overnight. However, the long-term benefits of a securities
forum will benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. Where both
parties are on equal footing, the law will prevail.
331. See Steinberg I, McMahon, supra note 67; see also supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
